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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERN FRAILEY, 
Plaintiff ·aoo Appellant, 
V1S. Case No. 2506 
JOHN C. McGARRY, 
Defendant atnd Respondent. 
REPL·Y BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Some matters are discussed in respondent's brief 
which were not covered in ap'pellant's original hrief. 
That being so it is deemed necessary to file a r~e-ply brief. 
It is stated on 'page 8 of resp-ondent's brief that there 
is nothing whatsoever in the record to s:how what p·rice 
defendant paid for the land. It is true that there is no 
direct evidence of such fact. The record does show that 
the sale of 1880 acres, which included the land in question, 
was confirmed for $1.50 per acre or $2,820.00 on October 
9th, 1945. (R 51-58). The deed to Edward H. Parry has 
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2 
attached thereto $3.30 U. S. Revenu·e stamps. That deed 
is dated October 13th, 1945. (R 58). Parry conveyed to 
defendant the 1880 acres on November 27, 1945. The 
deed recites $10.00 as the consideration. There are no 
revenue stamps attached to that deed. (R 60). 
At the time def.endant and plaintiff entered into the 
contract here involv·ed defendant had been engaged in 
the real estate business sp,ecializing in the sale of real 
estate in and about B·eryl. Unless Parry purchased the 
land for McGarry the deed from Parry to McGarry 
required re¥enue stamps if the sale was for more than 
$100.00. Courts assume the law has been complied with 
in the absence of proof to the contrary. If, as the evi-
dence shows, defendant has been in the real estate busi-
ness dealing espe·ciaHy in lands in and about B·eryl it is 
reasonable to assume that he would not p~ay much in 
excess of the market p~rice for real estate. Moreover, 
when the court struck. plaintiff's third cause of action, 
which ruling is assigned as error, it would seem that 
plaintiff was not entitled to show what defendant paid for 
the lands. We do not, however, deem it of controlling 
importance the amount defendant paid for the land or 
whether he received it by gift or purchase. What we do 
contend is that no matter how he secured title to the· 
land it is against the public policy of this state for the 
defendant to sp·eculate in its public water. ~The contract 
shows on its face that the defendant was to receive a 
profit of $26,200.00 out of the contract without the ex-
penditure of one cent of money or pierforming a moments 
work in developing the water. If, as def.endant seems 
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to contend, there is sufficient water to irrigate the land 
described in the contract defendant will rea:p that p·rofit 
no matter what plaintiff might do. If plaintiff should 
carry out the contract that is th·e profit he would receive. 
If plaintiff should default in the contract, defendants 
profit is $26,200.00, plus the money which plaintiff paid 
for filing the applications, plus also any money that 
plaintiff might expend in develop~ing water. 
If that is not speculation it must be on the tP:eory 
that defendant had a sure thing no matter what p~laintiff 
might do or fail to do, or that defendant has a vested 
interest in the public waters of this state notwithstanding 
he does nothing towards developing or putting the same 
to a beneficial use. 
Beginning on page 9 of respondent's brief it is ar-
gued that the fact, if it be a fact, that defendant made 
a large profit is no ground for the r·escission of the con-
tract and that the defendant was entitled to a lien on the 
water right applications as additional security. In mak-
ing such argument it is apparently assumed that an ap-
plication to appropriate water stands in the same cate-
gory as property rights generally. Our law is to the 
contrary. 
''All waters in this state whether above or 
under the ground are hereby declared to be the 
property of the 'public, subj·ect to all existing 
rights to the use thereof.'' 
U. C. A. 1943, 100-1-1. 
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As we have pointed out in our original brief it is the 
public policy of this state to prohibit sp·eculation in the 
public waters of this state because to do so will retard 
the develo1pment of the state. 
It is ap~parently conceded on page 12 of respondent's 
brief that the only basis for defendant's claim to the 
water filing is the contract. Under the authorities cited 
in the original brief a contract which is rescinded ~eaves 
the parties thereto as if the contract had never been ex-
ecuted. 
On pages 14 and 1'5 of respondent's brief it is ar-
gued that Thompson has no interest and claims no in-
terest in the water filings· which stand in his name. The 
evidence does not support such contention. The filings 
were made for Thomp~son and are in his name. 
It is alleged in Paragraph 1 of the further and af-
firmative defense of the defendant ''that such contract 
was witnessed by one J. E. 'Thompson * * * and whom 
said defendant was informed and believes and therefore 
alleges was interested in the purchase of said p·remises. 
(R 33). In paragraph.6 of the further answer complaint 
is made because p~laintiff and Thompson sought to trans-
fer the water right ap,plications to other lands. (R 34) 
In his reply plaintiff admits the allegations of para-
graphs 5 and 6 of defendant's further answer. (R 39) 
Throughout the testimony of Mr. Ward it appears that 
Mr. Thompson was the owner of the fi~ings which stood 
in his name. ( Tr. 152, 150, 147, 146, 141, 137). It is of 
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course elementary that one may not be deprived of his 
rights in an action to "Thich he is not a party. 
On page 20 of respondent's brief reference is made 
to certain testimony received at the trial. Obviously such 
testimony cannot aid the ruling made by the trial court 
in striking the Fourth Cause of Action, which ruling was 
made before the trial was commenced. 
RESPONDENT'1S CROSS-ASSIGNMENTS OF ER-
ROR AR.E NOT SUFFICIENT TO RAISE THE 
QUESTIO·N OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVI-
DENCE TO SUPPO·RT THE FINDING O·F FRAUD·. 
Respondent's 1st cross assignment of ~error is: ''In 
making that portion of finding No. 9 which finds that 
representations made by defendant to plaintiff as to 
availability of water for appropriation were untrue.'' 
(R 72). Sub-division 2 of Rule VIII of this court p~ro­
vides that the brief shall contain: ''a statement of 
the errors upon which he relies for a reversal of the judg-
ment or order of the court below." It will be noted that 
no reason or basis for the alleged error is referred to 
by the assignment. This court has repeatedly held that 
such an assignment does not raise the question of the 
insufficiency of the evidence to sup·port the finding. 
Among the eases so holding are : 
Ogden S~avings omd Trust Oo. vs. B'lakely, 66 Ut. 229; 
241 Pac. 221. 
Thomas vs. Perry Irr. Co., 63 Utah 490; 227 Pac. 2:68. 
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Hansen vs. Orregon Short Lime R.R. Co., 55 Utah 577; 
188 Pac. 852. 
R1os,s~er vs. Br:oadwiater Mills ·Co., 54 Ut. 522. 
Penw~arden vs. Penw·att1den, 54 Utah 129, 179 Pac. 988. 
Bta.m vs. Ogden Packing a;nd Ptf!ovision Co., 53 Utah 
248, 177 Pac. 218. 
Rolt vs. Gr:eat Eastern Co;swalty Co., 53 Utah 543; 
172 Pac. 1168. 
It will be noted that if finding No. 12 is permitted to 
stand no useful purpose would be secured by attacking 
finding No. 9. For a general discussion of the sufficiency 
of assignm·ents of error see 4 0. ;!. 8. page 1873. 
What we have said about assignment No.1 also ap-
plies to assignment No. 2. If assignment No. 1 fails it 
follows that assignment No. 2 must likewise be disre-
garded. 
Moreover, nowhere in his pleading does defendant 
allege or claim that rp~aintiff has by delay or affirmance 
waived any right he may have to roescind the contract. 
A claim of waiver or ·estopp.el is not available to a party 
who has neglected to plead it and the court cannot con-
sider or take notice thereof. The adjudicated cases 
touching such questions will be ·found annotated in 120 
A.L.R., pages 8 to 54. 
The only allegations in defendant's pleadings are 
to the effect that defendant was not guilty of fraud and 
even if defendant was guilty of fr'aud plaintiff may not 
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rescind the contract without assigning his and Thomp-
son's 'vater filings to the defendant. 
If the court should conclude that the- assignm~ents 
are sufficient and the claim of waiver, affirmance or 
estoppel is sufficiently pleaded to become an issue- in 
the case then and in such eve-nt we submit the follow-
ing facts and arguments in support of the trial court's 
finding No. 9. 
THE E\TIDENCE IS· AMPLE 'TO SUS·TAIN THE 
TRIAL COBRT 'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAD A RIGHT TO RESCIND THE CONTRAC'T. 
O·n page- 28 and 29 of respondent's brief it is con-
tended that the plaintiff was not entitled to rescind the 
contract because: 
1. One retaining benefits of a contract and continu-
ing to treat it as binding is deemed to have 
waived the fraud and elected to affirm the con-
tract, and a ·party _cannot rescind on grounds of 
fraud when after knowledge he affirms it. 
2. A contract must be rescinded in its entirety and 
the complaining party cannot affirm in part and 
rescind in part. 
3. One claiming to have bee-n defrauded must act 
promptly and any action in delaying the rescis-
sion to obtain an advantage is a ratification of 
the original agreement. 
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4. One who has opportunity to know the facts con-
stituting alleged fraud, or who learns the facts, 
cannot remain inactive and thereafter rescind 
the contract. 
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT SEEKING TO RETAIN 
ANY BENEFITS OF· THE CONTRAC·T. 
Apparently the defendant claims that plaintiff is at-
tempting to retain something that he was to receive from 
the defendant under the contract. Nothing is farther 
from the fact, unless defendant claims that he has some 
right in and to the public waters of the state. Indepen-
dent of the contract the defendant has not the shadow of 
a right to the applications to appropriate water. As we 
have pointed out in our original brief the authorities 
teach that when a contract is reS'cinded the parties are 
placed in statu quo; that is in a position as if no contract 
had ever been entered into. Not only will the plaintiff 
not receive any benefits from the ·contract when the 
same is rescinded but by choosing such r:emedy he will 
be deprived· of his right to recover the large damages 
he has sustained because of the fraud of the defendant. 
We have no quarrel with the statement that a con-
tract must be rescinded in its entirety. That is exactly 
what the p·laintiff is seeking to do in the present action. 
To give the defendant the right to the water applications 
would be to allow him to p·rofit by his fraud. He has paid 
nothing for the filings and the only possible claim that 
he has thereto is on account of the contract. When the 
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contract is resrinded every vestage of his claim vanishes 
as comp1etely as if no such claim ever existed. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT AFFIR~IED THE CON-
TR.ACT NOR HAS HE DELAYED IN ITS RECI'S-
SIOX. 
The facts bearing on that phase of the case are 
these: 
The contract is dated December 7,1945. On March 2, 
1946 the plaintiff received a letter from the state engi-
neer informing him that the application to appTopriate 
water would not be approved. Exhibit B ('Tr. 67). !Shortly 
after receiving the letter of March 2, 1946 the plaintiff 
went to the office of the state engineer to learn what, if 
anything, could be done about the applications. ( Tr. 14). 
Upon his return to Cedar City he informed the defen-
dant of what he had learned eoncerning the applications. 
He requested the defendant to furnish him, p.Jaintiff, 
additional water. The defendant refused to do so. Some 
conversation was had about compTomising the difference 
between plaintiff and defendant by reducing the amount 
of land that plaintiff was willing to buy. It is reasonable 
to conclude that when it became apparent that plaintiff 
could not raise a crop during 1946, contrary to what he 
'vas assured hy the defendant, plaintiff fore·saw that it 
would he difficult to make p~ayments on the larger tract. 
Nothing came of the attempt to eompromise. Contrary 
to defendant's contention such actions and statements 
by the plaintiff did not constitute an affirmance of the 
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contract. Quite the contrary. The defendant was then 
and there in effect informed that ·plaintiff did not intend 
to be bound by the contract, because he had been de-
frauded. The only reasonable conclusion that defendant 
could draw from such conversation was that the plaintiff 
would seek redress for the wrong he had sustained unless 
defendant made some satisfactory adjustment. 
On or about March 29, 1946, a meeting was held at the 
Beryl School House with some of the farmers in that 
vicinity. Plaintiff was not at that meeting. Those pres-
ent were not opposed to the drilling of additional wells. 
Nothing occurred at that meeting which sheds any light 
on the question of plaintiff's affirming the contract. 
On Ap1il 21, 1946 and April 25th, 1946 plaintiff sent 
to the state engineer the letters referred to on page 30 
of respondent's brief. Obviously the plaintiff could not 
and did not affirm the contract with defendant by writ-
ing a letter to the state engineer. It is apparent that 
plaintiff sought to secure the approval of some of his 
ap·plications for the purpose of saving the same and re-
moving them to other land, becausH on May 23, 1946 
he wrote a letter to the state engineer concerning chang-
ing the point of diversion . and after being advis,ed by 
the state engineer plaintiff filed his ap~plication to 'Change 
the place of use, and on August 9, 1946 a similar applica-
tion was filed by Thompson. In due time McGarry re-
ceived notice of these applications and filed obdections 
to the granting of the same. These actions on the part 
of the plaintiff not only fail to lend support to the claim 
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that plaintiff affirmed the contract. but sho,vs in no un-
certain tern1s that plaintiff was seeking as far as possible 
to saYe something out of the unfortunate predicament 
he "~as placed in on account of the fraud of the defendant. 
What has been said concerning the corres'Pondence with 
the state engineer is equally true with respect to th·e let-
ters \Yritten by Mr. Isom on June 13, 1946. Of course, 
the plaintiff, after he learned of th·e dilemma he was 
placed in by the fraudulent acts of the defendant, was 
seeking to retain his water applications in the hope that 
he might carry out his original plan to make his home in 
Utah and develop its resources. From the time plaintiff 
informed the defendant (immediately after he learned 
that water was not available in sufficient quantity to 
irrigate the land in question) nothing whatsoever was 
done which could possibly be construed to lead the de-
fendant to believe that plaintiff had waived his right to 
take whatever proceeding he deemed necessary to redress 
the wrong which plaintiff had sustained. 
It is indicated in the brief of defendant that because 
plaintiff requested defendant to furnish an abstract that 
he thereby affirmed the contract. Before rplaintiff could 
determine whether it was worth while to further nego-
tiate with the defendant concerning an adjustment of his 
difficulties with def.endant it was necessary for him to as-
certain if defendant in fact had title to the land he was 
seeking to sell. Without such information he could not 
safely proceed to deal with defendant under any circum-
stances. No one in his right sens·es would pay out Twenty 
Eight Thousand Eight Hundred dollars for a tract of 
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land in the absence of some assurance that when the 
money was paid he would be able to secure a good title 
to the property, which he was intending to purchase, 
especially from one who had already demonstrated that 
he was not reliable. In our original brief we have dis-
cussed what we believe to he the proper contruction of 
the contract touching the furnishing of an abstract or 
policy of title insurance and shall not enlarge on what 
1s there said. 
On the matter of the claimed delay in rescinding the 
contract it should he kept in mind at the outset that this 
is not a case which permits of a ready ascertainment of 
whether or not there is sufficient water available to 
supply the needs of the land which plaintiff sought to 
purchase. 
An ·examination of the cases cited by the defendant 
show that the facts there involved are so unlike the facts 
in this case as to render them valueless in this case. 
Thus in the case of LeVive vs. Whit.ehouse, 37 Ut. 
260; 109 Pac. 2. At p·age 271 of the Utah Reports the 
court recites the He facts. ''The record, howeve·r, also 
shows that Whitehouse must have known that the stock 
had only a speculative value, and according to his own 
testimony he discovered, about a month after the agree-
ment was. entered into, that the stock had no actual or 
market value and tha.t he thereafter, without protest, 
continued to accept payments (aggregating $600) on 
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the contract until the 8th day of November, eleven 
months after he learned that the stock 'vas p·ractically 
"ithout Yalue. In fact the first information the plaintiff 
had that the \Vl1i tehouses intended to base their re-
cissions of the contract on the ground of the alleged 
misrepresentations made to them resp~ecting the value of 
the stock so far as sho\Yn by the record was when they 
filed their amended answer, March 12, 1947, nearly two 
and one-half years after they discover,ed the fraud which 
they ·claim was practiced upon them.'' How the facts in 
that case are unlike the facts in this case is apparent. The 
defendant in this case was informed of r:plaintiff's claim 
that he had been defrauded within a few days after the 
plaintiff received information that his applications would 
not be approved. 
The other cases cited by defendant, as we read them, 
lend :even less support to defendant's eontention. It 
might have been enlighting to the court if defendant had 
included in his quotation from 12 ·0. J. S. 996, Sec. 38 
the following statement: 
''Nevertheless it has also been held that af-
firmance in such a case must he a solemn and de-
liberate act and where fraud exists as a ground for 
cancellation any equivocal acts on plaintiff's part 
which do not clearly evince a purpose, with com-
~plete knowledge of the fraud to affirm or to retain 
the property as his own will not defeat the right 
of person defrauded to rescind.'' 
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The law touching the recission of a contract is thus 
stated in 12 Am. Jur., pages 1028 and 1029, Sec. 445, 
' 446 and 447: 
''Ignorance of faets warranting a recission 
of the contract does not affect the right to assert 
such facts as a justification for recission. One may 
justify an asserted recission by proving that at 
the time there was an adequate cause although 
it did not become known to him until later. One 
cannot waive or acquiesce in a wrong while ignor-
ant thereof, and the wrongdoer cannot make ex-
treme vigilance a condition of recission. The per-
son wronged upon being fully advised must, how-
ever, decide and act with reasonable dispatch. 
(Sec. 446). The failure of a party to perform his 
part of a contract does not per se rescind it; the 
other party must manifest his intention to re-
scind within a reasonable time. A formal or writ-
ten notice is not necessary but the law requires 
on the part of him who would rescind som·e posi-
tive act which shows such an intention. Recission 
of a contract may be a matter of acts as W·ell as 
of words. Where the object of a suit is to obtain 
a decree of rescission no 1positive act manifesting 
an intention to rescind is necessary prior to suit, 
the bringing of the suit being a sufficient mani-
festation of such intention.'' 
Sec. 447: 
''A right to rescind, abrogate or cancel a con-
tract must be exercised promptly on discovery of 
the facts from which it arises; it may be waiv·ed 
by continuing to treat the contract as a subsisting 
obligation. 'The general rule is that th·e right tore-
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scind must be exercised within a reasonable time, 
although there is authority to the effect that the 
mere question of ho"T much time a party to a con-
tract has permitted to elapse is not necessarily de-
terminative of the right to rescind the important 
consideration being whether the p·eriod has been 
long enough to result in prejudice to the other 
party.'' 
''In action with resp·ect to recission of a con-
tract, without more, is not tantamount to a choice 
to continue it in existence.'' Richard vs. Credit 
Suiss-e, 242 N. Y. 346, 152 N. E. 110; 45 A. L. R. 
1041. 
On page 32 of respondent's brief it is said that there 
would have been no lawsuit and no attempt to rescind 
the contract had there been no proclamation suspending 
the right to make more filings. It may be that if plaintiff 
had been able to secure a water right by the simple pro-
cess of filing on additional water he would not he so con-
cerned about the applications here involved. But we are 
at a loss to s-ee how that fact aids the· defendant. The 
governor's proclamation p·rohibiting the filing on ad-
ditional water in the Beryl area was issued on April10, 
1946. When the p~roclamation was issued it became ap-
parent that the only hope of p·laintiff to carry out his 
plan to engage in farming in the Beryl area was to s·e-
cure some sort of water right from somewhere. Were it 
not for the governor's p~roclamation the defendant might 
well argue that he ·could not rescind the contract because 
he could go and file on additional water and that his 
remedy was for damages and not for the rescission of 
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the contract. Plaintiff was in no sense responsible ror 
the governor's proclamation nor may it be said that 
plaintiff was obligated to rescind the contract prior to 
April 10, 1946. 
On pages 30 and 32 of respondent's brief consider-
able is said about the motives which promp~ted p~laintiff 
to seek a recission. It would serve no useful purpose to 
discuss what plaintiff did or did not have in his mind 
at and before he concluded to seek a rescission of the 
contract. His right must be determined from what he 
said or did and not by what he may or may not have had 
in his mind. 
On page 34 of res1pondent's brief it is said that plain-
tiff has heretofore elected to affirm the contract as to his 
right to the filings and application, and has taken and 
used the water (as has Thompson also) from tw:o wells 
which have been drilled. If it is meant by such language 
that plaintiff has affirmed his right to his application to 
app·ropriate water then we are agreed. But if defendant 
claims that the effort of plaintiff to remove the appli-
cation to other lands and there use the water constitutes 
an affirmance of the contract then we certainly cannot 
agree with any such a conclusion because such acts were 
calculated to affect" a rescission and not an affirmance of 
the contract. 
o·n pages 42 to 49 of his brief res1pondent reviews the 
evidence touching what plaintiff did after he ·entered 
into the contract with defendant. Such evidence shows 
that plaintiff was in doubt as to what he could or should 
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do to escape fron1 the situation in 'vhich he found himself 
because of "That was falsely represented to him by thH 
defendant. Of course the plaintiff sought advice and in-
formation from the state engineer and others as to 
what w··ere the facts and as to his rights in the premises. 
To do that was the wise thing to do and that which he 
had a legal right to do. When the court examines the evi-
dence we believe that it will find that the plaintiff did 
absolutely nothing which could lead the defendant to 
believe that plaintiff intended to live up· to the contract 
after he discov.ered that there was not 'available a suffi-
cient supply of water to irrigate the lands described 
in the contract. 
So far as the record discloses the defendant was not 
prejudiced because of any claimed delay on the part of 
the plaintiff in serving a formal notice of recission or be-
ginning an action to- accomplish that purpose. As hereto-
fore pointed out defendant had timely and re'p1ea:tedly 
been warned that plaintiff did not intend to he bound 
by the contract. 
It is further contended by defendant that plaintiff 
retained possession of the land. The evidence shows 
and the court found that plaintiff did absolutely nothing 
with the land after h-e learned that there was a serious 
question about the availability of water with which to 
irrigate the same. Moreover it is obvious that it would 
have been a useless thing for p~laintiff to have made a for-
mal statement to the defendant to go and take his land. 
That such an offer would have been immediately re-
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jected is quite apparent. So far as appears defendant 
is not and has not been interested in having possession of 
the land. What he seeks to secure is the enormous profit 
which he hoped to secure from the plaintiff on account 
of his false and fraudulent representations. 
'The law does not require the doing of a useless thing. 
It is quite apparent that defendant was not concerned 
with the possession of this property, nor is there any 
p~leading on his behalf that P'laintiff was retaining pos-
session of the land. Under such a state of facts the de-
fendant may not be he~ard to complain. 52 .A.m. Jrr. 223. 
That the offer contained in the amended comp~aint 
meets all the requirements necessary to maintain an 
action for rescission finds support in the adjudicated 
cases. Walsh vs. Ma}ors et al, 49 Pac. (2d) 598 (Cal.); 
Buhler vs. Lofters, 165 Pac. 601; 53. Mom. 546-; 12 0. J. 8. 
1042, Sec. 57. 
It may well be that plaintiff is, if the contract is 
ordered rescinded, entitled to a lien upon the land to 
secure the payment to him of the $26;000 which he has 
paid. (2 C. J. S. 1103.). However, if and when the con-
tract is rescinded the defendant is entitled to the posses-
sion of the land. The only right the plaintiff ever had to 
the possession of the land was by reason of the contract. 
It follows as a matter of law that when the contract is 
rescinded plaintiff no longer has any right to the posses .. 
sion of the land. 
The plaintiff may not rescind the contract without 
the consent of the defendant. Because the defendant 
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would not so consent the plaintiff brought this action. 
It may be asked what more could the plaintiff do~ He 
could not forc·e the defendant to go upon the unimproved 
land. 
Defendant alleged in his answer and cross comrp·laint 
and the court found that plaintiff had abandoned the con-
tract. If plaintiff had abandoned the contract he was 
not in constructive possession of the land described 
therein. 
THERE IS. AMPLE EVIDENCE TO· SUSTAIN THE 
COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT SECURED 
THE EXECUTION OF 'THE CO·NTRACT BY FRAUD·. 
In the main the law ap·plicable to the facts disclosed 
by the evidence is well settled. To constitute actionable 
fraud sufficient to sustain an action for damages or for 
rescission of a contract it must be made to ap·pear: 
1. There must be a false ·stat·ement of a fact or by 
many authorities of an opinion. 
2. The statement must be material. 
3. It must be made with intention that it be acted 
upon. 
4. The p·erson to whom it is made must believe the 
statements to be true. 
5. The p·erson to whom the statement is made must 
sustain an injury or a damage. 
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Apparently defendant makes no claim that the ele-
ments of fraud mentioned in the above paragraphs 2, 3, 
4 and 5 have not been established by the evidence, nor 
could such a claim be successfully maintained. We shall 
therefore, confine our argument to the question of whe-
ther or not the defendant made a false representation of 
a fact or fraudulently expressed an opinion which he 
knew or should have known was false. 
The authorities teach that the discrepancy in the 
value of the p~roperty sold and the p~rice for which it is 
sold is in itself evidence of fraud. maC'lvOW'Ski VS. £vutz, 
184 Wis. 84, 301 N.W. 234. In this case defendant sold 
prop·erty worth $1.50 per acre for $30.00 p~er acre. 
When defendant's attorney filed the application in 
the office of the state ·engineer he was informed that 
such a:pplication would not be allowed. However, such 
information was not conveyed to the plaintiff. The testi-
mony of plaintiff and Jerold E. Thompson is that at the 
time of the negotiations the defendant assured them 
that there was ample water available to irrigate the land 
and that it was a mere formality to secure a permit from 
the state engineer to bore a well. ( Tr. 8-27-73). Plaintiff 
testified that he had read some circulars from Mr. Mc-
Garry. Tr. 7) J. C. McGarry testified that: "I would 
think I made the rep~·esentations they would have ampJe 
water for a certain amount of acreage.'' 
Q. Did you tell these men there was amp~le water to 
take, care of this land~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
A. I had no reason to believe there wasn't for the 
reason no applications had been denied, never 
been any wells denied. (Tr.164). 
Q. On these advertisements that you had made have 
you advertised there was ample water to irrigate 
lands out in that area~ 
A. Yes Sir, that is right. 
Q. You did so advertise~ 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. Are you still so advertising~ 
A. Only under applications which are m good 
standing. (Tr. 165). 
Defendant further testified that the advertising simi-
lar to that contained in plaintiff's Exhibit "E" had been 
used prior to 1945. It will be noted that ·among other 
things it is said in that exhibit: 
''We are confident that there is sufficient 
underground water within the valley to sustain 
1000 farm families and considering there is an 
average of five to the farm family would indicate 
that we have the building of a city of 15,000 people 
at 'Garryville'-our new. city which is located at 
the junction of two important highways, etc.'' 
Garryville is in the vicinity of the land described in 
the contract and the source of th·e water supp~ly for the 
1000 families and 15,000 peop~le is the same as the water 
supply for the land described in the contract. ('Tr. 166). 
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It will be noted· that the defendant continued to advertis·e 
that there was ample water in the Beryl area even after 
the governor had issued his proclamation prohibiting the 
filing on additiona:l water. 
In his brief, pages 53 to 57, res~pondent has directed 
the attention of the court to the testimony of Mr. Ward. 
We shall not repeat what is there said as the court will 
doubtless read all of his testimony. In its memorandum 
of opinion (R 64) the court observed that to supply 
the application filed in the office of the state engine·er on 
July 1st, 1945 and December 13, 1945, would require a 
flow of at least 580 cubic feet per second. Is it any won-
der that Mr. Ward was of the opinion that there was not 
sufficient water in the Beryl area to supp~ly the filings 
of said applications. 
That defendant knew or should have ~nown that 
there was not sufficient water available to supply the 
water right ~pplications on the land described in the 
contract is made evident by his own testimony. (Tr. 167) 
·on page 55 of appellant's brief the question is 
poised: "Was water available to irrigate the land in 
December, 1945 when the Frailey contract was written~" 
It seems to he defendant's contention that if water was 
then available no matter for how short a p~eriod of time 
there could be no fraud. Plaintiff was not interested in 
acquiring a water right for a day, a week or a year. 
D·efendant knew or certainly should have known that one 
who buys a tract of land with a water right has a right 
to assume a water right is p·ermanent and available from 
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year to year. It is inconceivable that any sane person 
would purchase land 'vith the understanding that it had 
or there could be secured a good water right with which 
to irrigate the same and go to the exp.ense of digging a 
well if such person knew or believed that the water right 
which h-e was to receive was only temporary. Successful 
farming in the Beryl area as well as elsewhere in this 
arid region requires that water rights be p·ermanent. 
Defendant must have known that plaintiff was not obli-
gating himself to pay $28.50 an acre for a water right 
that was to last only a day or a year. 
The statement that there is sufficient water available 
to irrigate land, if it means anything, must m·ean that 
under normal conditions there is and will be sufficent 
water for such purpose. Fortunately the amount of water 
available from a given source of supply in Utah is more 
or less constant. If it were not so Utah would become 
uninhabitable. 
Moreover the authorities teach that there are ex-
ceptions to the general rule that one is not liable for the 
expression of an opinion as to future events. 23 Am Jur., 
page 798; 37 C. J. 8. pages 234 and 237, and cases there 
cited. So also it is well settled that the supp·r~ession of a 
material fact which a party is bound in good faith to 
disclose is equivalent to a false representation. 37 C.J.S. 
244. Other rules of law applicable here are stated in 37 
C. J. 8., p·ages 245 to 247 which are to the effect that if 
a fact is :peculia.ry within the knowledge of one party and 
:of such a nature that the other party is justified in as-
suming its non-existence there is a duty of disclosure and 
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one who conveys a false impression by the disclosing of 
some facts and the concealment of others is guilty of 
fraud although his statement is true as far as it goes. 
Considerable is said in respondent's brief about 
plaintiff not believing that there is insufficient water 
available to irrigate the premises described in the con-
tract. It is argued that because he is seeking to have the 
applications transferred to other land he must believe 
there is ample water. It must be kep·t in mind that plain-
tiff has ceas·ed his farming operations in California and 
is attempting to establish himself permanently in the 
Beryl area. If he is to carry out his v:enture he must 
have a water right. That he entertains a hop·e that he 
will, with the water app·lications app·lied for, together 
with other water that he may acquire, be able to per-
manently est~blish himself at Beryl, is a reasonable con-
clusion. However, such fact does not preclude him from 
the relief which he seeks in this suit. The authorities are 
to the effect that if a fraud is such that the defrauded 
party would not have entered into the contract had he 
known the true facts then and in such case he is ·entitled 
to rescind the contract, unless he has an adequate rem-
edy at law. No claim is made or can he successfully main-
tained that a remedy at law would he adequate. 
On pages 62 and 6B of respondent's brief it is ar-
gued that plaintiff has abandoned the contract. If plain-
tiff's suit to rescind the contract constitutes an abandon-
ment then obviously he has abandoned the ·contract. 
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It is also argued that because plaintiff failed to pay 
the taxes he h·as forfeited all of his rights under the· 
contract. Here again if ~plaintiff had p·aid the taxes 
the defendant would doubtless be here contending that 
plaintiff had ratified the contract because he had paid 
the taxes. 
Before concluding this brief the attention of the 
court is again directed to the fact that the trial court in 
its memorandum of decision stated that if the plaintiff 
would within fifteen days assign his water right ap·pli-
cations and prevail upon Thompson to assign his appli-
cations to the defendant then and in such ·case the plain-
tiff was entitled to a return of the money paid to defen-
dant, together with the cost of m'aking th·e filings and 
legal interest th·ereon. Of course if plaintiff had comi>~ied 
with such an O'P'tion he would have been dep·rived of his 
right to a review by this court of the question of whether 
or not he is entitled to the water filings. 
It would seem to be contrary to justice and equity to 
hold that plaintiff should be dep~rived of the money to 
which the trial court held he was entitled to becaus·e he 
elected to e:x:ercise his constitutional right to app·eal to 
this court and here seek a review of the entire cause. 
If the trial court believed that plaintiff was ~entitled 
to the return of the money he had p~aid out and defendant 
was ·entitled to the water right applications there was 
no reason why the trial court should not have so ad-
judged. Plaintiff should not he deprived of that to which 
the trial court found he is entitled to because he failed 
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voluntarily to surrender that to which he believes he is 
entitled to. 
We submit that the judgment appealed from should 
be reversed and the trial court directed to amend the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decr·ee as 
prayed for by plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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